Introduction
What follows will examine subculture as a concept, if it is indeed a concept, its origins, growth, and possible decline; and to what extent it may be related to Kierkegaard's (1849 Kierkegaard's ( /1929 concept of despair, 'a disease of the self'.
Why Kierkegaard? His The sickness unto death is a fascinating theory; even if not, perhaps, entirely tenable it is exceptionally perceptive on self-deception. In brief outline:
The self is a relationship which relates to itself, or the relationship in so far as the relationship relates to itself... In the relationship between two the relationship is the third, as a negative unit ... If conversely the relationship relates to itself, then that latter relationship is the positive third, that is to say, the self... Despair is a sickness of the spirit, in the self, by implication a triple: desperately not being aware of having a self (inessential despair); (a self) desperately not willing to be itself; (a self) desperately willing to be itself. (1849/1929:143) Quite a mouthful. A more palatable version: An I, a Self relates to lots of different things -relations of use, talk, reflection, etc., gathering experience, forming opinions of the world, its things and tools, of other selves etc. Among these different entities the I itself also figures more or less prominently; laying plans for itself, praising or criticising itself, forming more or less stable ideas of what it can or cannot manage etc. The I, in many brief and passing ways, relates to its own activities or passivities, which tend over time to approach settled forms -thus becoming 'the positive third' of the quote, a relationship of its own, more or less fixed, by and through innumerable single instances of relating 2 .
So far for the self. Despair 3 may arise in it as forever new instances of relating occur, in accord or not with its fixed form up to now. Kierkegaard speaks first of not being willing to be one's self, as 'the despair of weakness'. Take for example Hjalmar Ekdal of Ibsen's The wild duck, a photographer and a father who is not really trying very hard to be either, and further, not relating to that fact, except theatrically and ephemerally when disaster strikes 4 . Next, the 'despair of defiance' (or baulkiness, Da. Trods is not easily translated), or desperately willing to be one's self, that is fashioning a self for oneself -fitting, attainable or not. Sticking with Ibsen, perhaps Eilert Løvborg of Hedda Gabler, he who writes on 'the course of future's culture'. Or Solness of The Master Builder, who dares at last to mount the apex of his structure. And of course, Brand. All fail to be sure, but only after having made great efforts, their despair plainly visible.
For a lesser, or a different literary example, take Presley's Hound dog, who's 'never gonna rebel and ain't no friend of mine', for the first type. For the second, those 'rebels' or 'rockers' themselves who desperately want to succeed for themselves against the current, both before and after their movement's surge.
The hypotheses: Subculture 5 as despair
Which anticipates the link to present-day SCs: we hypothesise that two types of SC adherents can be distinguished, corresponding roughly to Kierkegaard's latter two types: (1) weakness, or those who don't really want to ever go entirely SCal but are content by toying or playing with it, keeping an amount of 'role distance'; and (2) defiance, or those who want to go all the way but remain dimly aware that their aim isn't really well attainable, except perhaps for the rare few who consequently live the life of 'endangered species', such as the Jimi Hendrixes, Janice Joplins, Jim Morrisons, Kurt Cobains etc. -or the Baudelaires, Mozarts, van Goghs, Charlie Parkers, Jack Kerouacs, certainly not forgetting Søren Kierkegaard himself, this text being his last extensive work six years before his premature death at 43.
The first type -weakness -would seem to harbour a double, if less acute, despair: That of not wanting to remain an ordinary lower-class youth, and simultaneously wanting to approach but not to be totally engulfed by, a set of SCal ways or symbols, well expressed by Phil , here quoted from Hebdige 1979 ... a compromise solution between two contradictory needs: the need to create and express autonomy and difference from parents ... and the need to maintain their parental identifications ... (to) express and resolve, albeit magically, the contradictions which remain hidden or unresolved in the parent culture.
The second or defiant type is more clear-cut. The all-out SC member is also desperately wanting to be what s/he is (yet) not, not to be what s/he is (now). But at the outset or apex of the movement it is more likely to be all defiant, a ostentative contrast, going for a maximum or to the brink. Come time, this may change into weariness, despondency or resignation; or into nostalgia, 'those were the days', 'Frankie's wild years', auch ich in Arkadien etc. -cf. Baudrillard 1997 on the role of pastiche in art.
Suggesting that SC may involve this 'sickness' -or despair, duplicity, self-deception, as a lasting or passing phase -does not at all imply its being 'less real' or less worthy of attention. It is, not unlike infatuation, probably more intense than 'ordinary life', especially the second or defiant type; a high-strung phase -perhaps enviable -of hyper-life, more real than the commonplace real, some would hold. More about the role of enthusiasm or fascination inside and out of SCs later.
'Social despair' -and its limits
Now for Kierkegaard's less tenable views: The implication, not explicit but also not explicitly ruled out, that any self is despair and nothing but despair in one of the three forms mentioned, should be avoided. The idea, if that was Kierkegaard's or is anybody else's, that 'the sickness unto death' is a dominant state, is not tenable. Life is not all weakness or defiance, it is resolution and perseverance as well. Cf. the 'Parson's sermon' of Ibsen's Peer Gynt -the farmer who did his job, all of it, dodging enlistment and other sidetracking efforts 6 . That is, a self, or a self-other-relation, at ease with itself -a case of routinely won objectivation (eu-pragia 7 ), as it was. However, selves such as that are no problem -and admittedly perhaps not very frequently found. Who doesn't ask oneself 'Is this really me?', 'Can't win'em all, can you?', or 'Am I not overdoing it?' every so often? So the focus remains on selves in despair -in, dare we say, subpathologic states or aspects, prominent if not dominant; more comeand-go than either-or, perhaps.
Further, Kierkegaard of course knew nothing about a social psychology such as George Herbert Mead's (1934) , the much later idea 8 of a self being formed, not through self-reflection but through 'the play, the game and the generalised other'. Today's self is not by far a 'self-made self', it's more of a latecomer, confined to doing the best of the remnants left by a number of 'significant (and less significant) others'. We, our Selves, however cherished or rejected, are not alone in the world; we are made and shaped by others, whom we continue to rub against, pat affectionately, pay limited attention etc. The influence of others may work both as an excuse for not trying to change ourselves even when we can, but it may certainly form real opposition, obstacles, enemy forces as well. So the despair of SCs may be less a 'disease of the self' and more a 'disease of the self-other relation', more about which later when we discuss the non-autonomy of SCs.
Elsewhere (Otnes 1997a: 7,11) , I have outlined, 'the converse Kierkegaard', a worse and more basic form of despair, 'a disease of your Other': (a) not believing that you have an Other, or (b) believing that you have one but suspecting that your self has been entirely 6 From Kierkegaard's Either-Or certainly the character B, the devoted husband, and perhaps even A, the seducer, are integral, balanced, reflective characters, not (often) desperate. 7 Greek for good, successful work or practice. 8 Not necessarily later; this may relate to K.'s wholesale rejection of Hegelianism, including the 'master vs. slave dialectics', certainly among Mead's inspirations. engulfed by him/her, or (c) suspecting that you have engulfed him/her, i.e. taken over all control of that other. Simplified, (a) 'nothing new under the sun'; (b) the unease of the total follower, or 'Am I not being lived, not living?'; and (c) 'do I have to take all the decisions here?' respectively. In their inessential forms, traditional, existential despair implies 'being nobody in a world of bodies', while social despair implies being somebody without anybody else, as if alone in an empty world. 'Vanity of vanities; all is vanity' (Eccl. 1:2). The essential versions involve acknowledging your Other/your Self, but then, overstating or shying away from your insight.
All of which are traceable, in more or less direct forms, within or around SCs, as we shall see.
A complicating factor of recent origins is 'the Generalised Observer' -the Media: Today we don't know who we are until we see it on TV/other media. Videor ergo sum 9 -in the Warhol age of '15 min.'s world fame for all' who or what is not being seen does not exist.
So far for our hypotheses; now for their substantiation, working through the words, the concepts and their histories.
Culture, the general concept
As is well known, definitions of culture generally abound (cf. Kuper 1997) . A recent local definition by anthropologist Unni Vikan (1995:17) may do as well as any:
Today we can agree that culture refers to the sum of learned (as opposed to biological) knowledge and 9 'I'm being seen therefore I am'. experience in a group 10 . Earlier, we held that these values had to be unanimous and that they were transmitted from one generation to the next, which has proved to be untenable. Schütz (1937 Schütz ( /1964 is worth quoting on the failing coherence of a dominant culture, from the point of view of a sociologist 'stranger' or immigrant/refugee:
...the knowledge of the man who acts and thinks within the world of his daily life is not homogeneous; it is (1) incoherent, (2) only partially clear and (3) not at all free from contradictions.
So, adhering to a dominant culture does not, perhaps, involve so much being in total conformity as being in a tacit, as if automatic, agreement to avoid situations and questions which would expose the muddles or contradictions of dominance -the doxa, or discourse taken as if selfevident (Bourdieu 1977:164ff ). Østerberg's (1997:11) definition is particularly elegant. After defining sociology as 'the science of social conflict and integration', and cultural sociology as the branch which '... deals with culture in the wide and narrower sense, in the light of social conflict and integration', he goes on:
The concept of culture in the wide sense comprises all giving form to our existence; custom and etiquette, rituals and institutions of all types... Culture in the narrower sense comprises activities and arrangements which mirror, express and appraise culture in the wide sense.
The unease of innumerable writers trying to conceptually unite 'high' and 'low', elite or mass culture, resolved in three simple wordsmirror, express, appraise! Some pages later Østerberg introduces hegemony 11 :
The modern culture is a hegemonic world culture, admitting non-modern traits from early on -Chinese interiors, Persian carpets, Turkish janissary music... All of this does not threaten modernity's hegemony; it is rather an aspect of modernity as a dialectical concept: modern culture will acquaint itself with everything (1997:32-3).
So, no more than 'old' foreign interior items do 'recent' salsa, neo-punk, 'camp' interiors, or Mongolian overtone chant in themselves threaten the general, hegemonic culture of modernity, nor do they of necessity constitute SCs; they testify rather to the great resilience of modernity.
The present author's preference, however, is for a less elegant formula, culture as a set of artefacts typically used and customs typically observed among a set of persons.
Most standard general definitions, remember, were formed in opposition to the materialism of the preceding researcher generation; not so much that of the Marxian type -in existence but rare -but of the ethnographic type, Musée de l'Homme-type artefact collections, the 'museum science'. Present anthropologists, re-assuming on occasion the ethnographer label, are starting to transcend that, a typical title being Daniel Miller's 'Things ain't what they used to be ' (1983) . Pure, as if immaterial, knowledge simply cannot be formed without material artefacts being used on raw or semi-processed materials.
Recently serious and vociferous doubts are being raised on the applicability of the general concept of culture in anthropology, cf. Longva (1997) . Phrases such as 'culture has to go' (Ingold 1993) or 'scrap culture' (Kuper 1997) has occurred in earnest. We cannot go into that debate here; suffice to say that the concept is, by some, beginning to be seen as too general or embracing, too static ('reifying exotism'), too loaded, carrying unhappy connotations etc., and so perhaps better replaced by less general yet not very specific successors -a whole family of terms such as custom, fad, field, habit, identity, lifestyle, movement, mentality, network, tradition, even lifeworld or value system -a whole family of petits récits, in 'post-modern' terms.
In sum so far, culture generally is a concept and an entity in flux, not fully stable; it is disputed, not altogether consensual, i.e. following Schütz, not coherent, only partially clear, and containing contradictions. Or following Østerberg, it is part of the general study of social conflict and integration. This is what I call 'the metonymic turn' in cultural studies, the problem of which consists much less in finding a general, unanimous definition, and much more in selecting crucial, revealing, informative single sets of traits for closer study. 'Random sampling' of cultural items would be senseless -and continued discussion of the general concept not much less so.
We've touched on the 'culture of whom?' problem 12 : Whose custom, knowledge etc. is this? No less a problem is the 'culture for whom?', or discourse problem: Who are speaking, studying, appraising etc. whose -who else's ? -culture? This may be related to Pike's (1967) emicetic distinction, the idea that anthropological fieldwork can be subdivided in emic or actors' point of view studies, and studies from the etic or external, expert, comparative point of view, the linguistic distinction of phonemics and phonetics being the model. This is, however, problematic in terms of epistemology, notably Skjervheim's 1957 Skjervheim's /1976 discussion of the participant and observer positions, his point being that a pure, good-faith neutral observer is on reflection not really possible (cf. also Otnes 1997b). Social scientists 13 can only pretend to be uncommitted or 'neutral'; value, consciously or not is always present; it cannot be exorcised out of the profession, not even by linguistics or philosophers.
So the etic or 'neutral scientific observer' is a perplexing position, yet the distinction may serve a purpose. Knowing who is speaking does matter: a member of the culture or an outside social science observer, 'neutral' or partisan? Notably, a culture's self-image will be very reluctant to admit openly those incoherences, confusions and contradictions (Schütz) which are everyday commonplaces for the social scientist.
What culture is not
In a comic strip, Hagar the viking is telling his son: 'Culture is everything we do in order to be admired by others'. In the following strip, his son asks 'Can you tell me what is not culture?', which leaves Hagar with no answer through a sleepless night. The trick of including struggles over culture within the concept is a nice try but still too inclusive, involving no real negatio, no ruling out. Østerbergs idea of conflict and cohesion as integral parts is promising, however, and Bourdieu's distinction (1984), a changing but arguably an objective hierarchy of tastes. The trick is taking this idea from the programmatic to the implementation and system stages, well done by both, yet with more system to it in Bourdieu.
In fact, the tradition of scientific culture studies is selectivity, not totality. For Tylor, culture was language, arithmetic, creeds, beliefs, myth, and nothing much else. For traditional (European) ethnology it was very largely based on 'natural cycles' such as individual's or household's 'life cycles' 19 ), the seasons'; or the 'near-far'-dimensionfrom personal clothing to world trade say; or typologies of various 17 In the original the opposites are infinitude-finitude, and possibility-necessity 18 Or scapegoating, in common, inexact terms. Touraine's (1978) The great International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences has no separate entry for SC 23 . The term is, however, listed in its Index, with 11 separate entries, three of which to be found under 'delinquency' (whereas 'deviance' is absent, except for 'sex' below), three others special cases thereof ('drug addiction' (two entries) and 'homicide'), two more concern 'homosexuality' and 'sexual deviation'. The penultimate two are starting to approach present use -'class culture' and 'political culture', both of which, while conceding that studies of subordinate cultures dominate ('culture of poverty', 'mass culture') yet do discuss the study of political or class 'elite cultures' as well. Only the last instance, 'educational organisation' is more or less plainly in The Concise Oxford (1990) in some contrast takes 'beliefs or interests at variance with the larger culture' as SC's specific trait -weaker and wider, it seems, than the Norwegian formula avviker betydelig or 'deviates notably'. Now to Hebdige himself, starting with the narrower, or rather, the distinct, counter culture:
The term counter culture refers to the amalgam of 'alternative' middle-class youth cultures -the hippies, the flower children, the yippies -which grew out of the 60s, and came to prominence during the period 1967-70. As Hall (& Jefferson) (1976) have noted, the counter culture can be distinguished from the subcultures we have been studying by its explicitly political and ideological forms of its opposition to the dominant culture (political action, coherent philosophies, manifestos, etc.), by its elaboration of alternative institutions (...), its 'stretching' of the transitional stage beyond the teens, and its blurring of the relations, so rigorously maintained in subculture, between work, home, family, school, and leisure 24 . Whereas opposition in subculture is, as we have seen, displaced into symbolic forms of resistance, the revolt of middle class youth tends to be more articulate, more confident ... more easily 'read ' (1979:148) .
The core terms here are symbolic forms of resistance. Subculture as sub-surface, yet not crystallised protest or potential opposition, is stressed repeatedly, more so than in the 'parent' text of Hall & Jefferson (1976) , which admits degrees of SCs, more or less distinct. Both, however, deal with juvenile groups, movements or cohorts, almost to exclusion. A this stage, it would appear that older peoples' roles in SCs are strictly those of spectators, opponents or supporters, enemies or fans, never full members.
Here as elsewhere in Hebdige's text SC appears as something of a fuzzy set, developed around a small set of instances, notably the punk movement, targeted more on demonstrating the power of a semiotic, symbol-reading type of analysis, than on developing a general analytic concept, i.e. a complete and exhaustive classification of all more or less deviant, distinctive, or 'at variance', life-styles or life-forms or social movements. A model for research, not a definition, is proposed.
Most writers still tend to attribute an inordinate significance to the opposition between young and old, .. rites of passage ... What is missing ... is any explanation of why these particular forms should occur at this particular moment. (Hebdige 1979:73) 24 Slightly overstated in my opinion. While some SC members can and do make efforts to keep their 'variant' ways well out of sight for all outsiders (high segregativity, cf. Hannerz 1980), others such ways are difficult to hide. A punk's safety pin, chains and dog collar can be taken off, not their hairdo.
There is mention of a sequence of successive juvenile movements, some of them specified (teds, mods, ska, rastas, hippies), to which others could be added, at least from dada and surrealism on, through the swing freaks' mass wave of the 30ies, with existentialism, jazzfans, beatniks, rockers, skins following, and further taggers, hiphop, grunge, 'generation X', and 'XTC', to house, techno, scratching and what not; faster changes and smaller staying power over the years, it seems.
Hebdige exemplifies a paradigm change, sort of, in anthropology andto some extent in sociology too -from functionalism into semiology or hermeneutics, 'the interpretation of meaning'. Prominent analyses concern the use of symbols in bricolage, i.e. surprising or shocking selection and juxtaposition, prototypically punk's safety pin earring 25
A half in-, half outsider myself, I have wondered whether Hebdige's (and similar) accounts would be at all intelligible for a person who knew absolutely nothing about the Punk movement, its Ted and Mod predecessors etc. Though he admits to '... a kind of romanticism... ' (1979:138) , or fascination more precisely, his book does at times approach a fan club sort of thing, a cohort or its observers taking their fancy with them into social science and advancing age.
Much more interesting than this individual criticism, however, is a general point, so to speak the 'post-Derrida ' (1974:158) : c'est du horstexte, ça. The meaning of SCs is hardly possible to grasp through texts alone; it requires having seen the events, the props and costumes, at least on pictures or screens; having heard the stories or the music, an ability to recognise a style by its less obvious details etc. A commendable start for a total outsider would be the thoroughly 25 Jean Genet's Vaseline tube is Hebdige's starting point, the police reading it as a sign of the male homosexual, most often thought of as a lasting SC, not a passing stage; a 'master status' (Hughes), however unofficial. As a sign, his tube will disclose rather than signify; unlike punk's safety pin it is not for willed display. In Peirce's terms it's an index not a symbol, signal rather than sign.
illustrated Les mouvements de mode expliqués aux parents (Obalk et al. 1986 ), an eloquent resignation of the written text into pictures.
The changes reviewed
Summing up so far, SC before c. 1970 (SC I) implied being: (1) distinctive, but also with continuities to a dominant culture, and so by implication dominated, not itself dominant (2) affecting the total life of its members, (3) locally based, (4) closed or kept apart, (5) not (often) restricted to youth or other age cohorts alone.
In short, SC I is (1) distinct, (2) total, (3) local, (4) not widely known, and (5) In short once more, SC II is still (1) distinct, but (2) segregative 26 rather than total, (3) widely, even generally publicised, i.e. receiving, provoking and being provoked by dominant media attention, (4) an age cohort, typically a group of youth in the late teens or early twenties -and later, as typically, revived or an object of nostalgic attention as that cohort and its older fans advance in age. SCs are above all (5) new, selective '... expressive forms ... each (moving) through a cycle of resistance and defusion...' (Hebdige 1979:130, 132) . Gottdiener (1995:243-52) gives a vivid account of how he first discovered and gradually learned to decipher or 'read' punk, its music, style and ideas. Leaning on Hebdige but even more on later works by Marcus (1989) and Savage (1992) He criticises Hebdige, who '...could not decipher the code of Punk' (1995:249), a major shortcoming for a researcher who aimed exactly for that -if indeed he's correct, for Hebdige did surmise the root specified by Gottdiener/Marcus above. Hebdige succeeds, I think, in explaining some noted punk symbols such as the much-adoed safety pin, chains, plastic etc., which stand for pain, poverty and being dominated -but, all flaunted as ironic 'jewellery', 'fashion' etc. as against 'real', expensive earrings, necklaces, silk. The historic root in pre-punk's contrast to and envy of Black, immigrant Caribbean youth culture (ska, reggae), is less convincing though: The differences are clear but their influence not really demonstrated.
SC IIs are not fields (champs), not autonomous social systems
Both Gottdiener and Hebdige, however, remain punk fans, more or less fascinated by the phenomenon.
Similar cases of fascinated nostalgia are well known in Norway as well. With hippie and ultra-leftist movements waning in the late 70ies, new juvenile groups emerged, practising illegal occupation of vacant housing etc. For some years they celebrated the custom of 'the night before the 1st of May' -youth drinking and dancing in Oslo's city streets, including occasional vandalism, looting and clashes with the police. The morning after, the usually so quiet city streets would be full of debris and reek of lachrymogenes. There were studies made, by sympathisers/participants (e.g. Fryjordet 1986 ), supervised by sympathising post-gauchiste senior researchers 27 . The events came to an end in 1985, by shrewdly organised public competition: NRK, or the local BBC started to broadcast major rock/pop events, irresistible for the young people involved, that very night.
Who, then, are the instigators of SCs? In the old sense (SC I) this was by and large an insulated thing, with few or restricted outside influences. Not so in the recent sense: We cannot really speak of a SC -SC II -without acknowledging the major influence of the media, both as willed and provoked from within a SC, and as best-selling headlines etc. constructed from without it. Stan inventory concept is in point, the exaggeration and distortion etc. required to depict SC as a 'folk devil', a marketable commodity -first a scare, later, 'defused' as chic mimicry or play-along. For a contemporary SC, public attention, or 'visibility', equals life; it simply can't emerge without. Fennefoss (1996) discusses a case in point in a study of 'youth events' in a Southern Norwegian town. There was agreement that 'something happened' but not on what label would fit. A policeman who caught a glimpse of Fennefoss' field note form with the subheading 'rebellion' (Norw. 'opprør') cried out in protest to his superior, 'he's calling it a rebellion!! Local definitions were 'riots', or 'disturbances', 'hooliganism' or 'noisy youth' but certainly not anything near 'rebellion', despite the fact that on occasion, shop windows were broken followed by some looting.
In conclusion Fennefoss embraces Bourdieu's idea of 'a struggle over classifications' (Bourdieu 1985) , or jeu de champ, illusio. Any field is constantly (re-)constructing itself, always as a mixture of resignation and new initiatives. We note the fact that the 'primary field' -the noisy youth -has no control over in what category their activities will belong in the end. Other players, border actors or members of other fields (champs) are as or more decisive: police, local and national press, other media, local politicians, parent groups, scared or understanding neighbours etc.
Desperately social
Our task was to demonstrate a link between being a SC member and Kierkegaard's conception of despair. And the less they/we know, the more they/we need the comfort of conspicuous cases of what they/we're not. This is SCs, or any similar ostentatious contrasts, in their main social role, being played, not playing: They serve to save the dominant culture from its own, increasing, non-coherence. ... a spectacular subculture is strictly impossible because all style and taste cultures, to some degree or another, express something of a general trend to find and make identity outside the realm of work (1990:16).
Post
most have been acceptable hobbies all along (intra-or juxta-i.e. side cultures).
Bridge, bingo etc. may sound boring to some. But does social science know beforehand, without closer study, that the symbol use in such contexts is less creative, even less of a 'resistance', than that of noisier, more 'visible' youth cohorts? We do know, however, that cultural studies don't really take off until difference emerges. Whosoever says culture, says difference, hierarchy. The tradition of a 'cultural analysis' which knows how to create a commotion but no animosity is, may I say, barely supportable even if well supported.
Concluding remarks
Here is the basis of dominant culture's own 'sickness unto death' or despair -that of not having an Other -our worse and more basic despair than Kierkegaard's. Total unity cannot be, it has to be established in contrast to -something else, something different, 'at variance': an Other, a deviant group, a SC. If one of these sides is impaired, the other will suffer as well, as a result, unless Alterity is recast as a challenge, a potential for Ego change, not a mere contrast.
In Kierkegaard's terms, 'The despair of infinity is to lack limits'. A whole will have to struggle trying to build its own bounds. Durkheim's theory of punishment comes to mind: 'Punishment is above all designed to act upon upright people ... its true function is to maintain social cohesion intact... ' (1893/1964:108 ). It's by highlighting and ostracising contrast that 'the moral majority' maintains its shady selfimage.
Contemporary SCs, we have suggested, are more and more diluted, short-lived, and machinated by the marketing interest rather than borne by participants' enthusiasm, then over time there will arise a need for finding fresh, or longer-lived, or more conspicuously variant or deviant SCs or 'post-SCs', able to create new, striking, 'offensive' symbols etc. They will come, make their headlines, pass their summit and end as 'diluted', but with the requisite power to shock, which is exactly what a weakening dominant or super culture needs. Take McLaren's case, which made his point plus a whole movement 'despite resistance', hence a case of power in Weber's classic sense. Later, lesser, ephemeral cases such as Generation X (Coupland 1992) and Generation XTC (Böple et al. 1997 ) are market, not movement successes, comparatively powerless 31 We may safely predict that there will be more to come, both milder and wilder.
There is also the case of Baudrillard (1997) , a case of parallel thinking from a different field -'high art' and its decay. For example Warhol doing his Campbell soup cans in the 60ies was brilliant, transcending whereas Warhol repeating himself towards the end of his career vraiment nul, only pastiche, repetition, old hat, not even travesty.
Similarly for 'neo-punk', 'neo-tagging' or similar movements: What was shocking and revealing some decades ago can hardly be much else than boring today.
Based on the work of Sarah Thornton it has been suggested that 'subcultural capital' is short-lived 32 . Very credible indeed, but are not the elements of host, dominant or hegemonic culture becoming as shortlived these days? In the words of Yeats' well-known poem, "Things fall apart, the centre cannot hold". 
